Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 3

Summer 6-1-2011

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: NOT A SUITABLE APPROACH FOR
EVALUATING CLIMATE REGULATION POLICIES
Gregory Scott Crespi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/jece
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gregory Scott Crespi, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: NOT A SUITABLE APPROACH FOR
EVALUATING CLIMATE REGULATION POLICIES, 2 Wash. & Lee J. Energy, Climate & Env’t. 227
(2011), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/jece/vol2/iss2/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment by an authorized editor of Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:
NOT A SUITABLE APPROACH FOR
EVALUATING
CLIMATE REGULATION POLICIES
Gregory Scott Crespi*
Abstract
Cost-benefit analysis is a widely used approach for guiding public
sector policy decisions. Given the impetus provided by strong evidence of
global warming, numerous scholars are now considering the role that costbenefit analysis should play, if any, in assessing climate regulation policies,
and are offering recommendations as to how this methodology can be
better utilized in that context. However, that scholarship invariably
overlooks the fact that conventional cost-benefit analyses implicitly
embrace the untenable assumption that the genetic identities of future
persons are exogenous with regard to the policies being evaluated. The
conclusions of such cost-benefit analyses are therefore irrelevant to the real
choices at hand, since genetic identity is in fact endogenous relative to the
policies that we pursue. In other words, our current policies will not only
have long-term impacts upon the wealth of future persons, they will also
determine who those persons are, and that important consequence should
not be overlooked.
The various recommendations that these scholars offer with regard to
improving cost-benefit valuation techniques for measuring the social cost of
carbon emissions, or with regard to properly discounting future policy
effects, are somewhat beside the point given the fundamentally inapt
valuation comparisons that most cost-benefit analysts are making. This
scholarship would perhaps be better directed at first of all developing some
suitable means for incorporating the endogeniety of identity into costbenefit analysis.
In this short article I draw upon the work of Derek Parfit to
demonstrate the devastating implications that recognition of the
endogeniety of identity has for the relevance of conventional cost-benefit
analysis for climate regulation policy. I also discuss and criticize for their
failure to address this problem several recent efforts by leading scholars to
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critique and improve the application of cost-benefit analysis to climate
regulation policy.
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I. Introduction
The evidence is rather convincing that rapid and significant global
warming is taking place, and as a result climate regulation policy has
become a focus of scholarly attention.1 One important academic discussion
relates to the proper role that cost-benefit analysis should play, if any, in
guiding the development of climate regulation measures.2 Among those
scholars who have decided that the cost-benefit methodology is a suitable
approach for comparing the relative merits of alternative climate regulation
policies there are also discussions regarding how the different valuations
that this methodology calls for can be most accurately calculated and
rendered comparable with one another.3
Unfortunately, however, the efforts being made to assess and improve
the application of cost-benefit analysis to the difficult questions posed by
climate regulation consistently avoid the central conceptual difficulty
presented by the use of that methodology in this context where policy

1. See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH STANTON, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1
(2010) (discussing the average expected damages of climate change); Jonathan Masur &
Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis 2 (U. Chi. Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 315, 2010) (examining the record of the federal agencies and the
Interagency Working Group for agreement on climate change).
2. See Richard Revesz & Matthew Shahabian, Climate Change and Future
Generations 79–82 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10–38, 2010) [hereinafter
Revesz & Shahabian] (addressing the more general question of how to properly discount the
future policy impacts of various regulatory alternatives to present values for comparison
with their current costs).
3. See id. at 10–59 (addressing the general question of how to discount the future
policy impacts of regulatory alternatives in comparison with current costs).
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choices will have important long-term consequences.4 Virtually none of
this recent work addresses a fundamental problem that renders essentially
irrelevant the conclusions of cost-benefit analysis whenever the analysts
start from conventional baseline assumptions when attempting to assess the
long-term consequences of a policy for future persons who have not yet
been conceived when the policy is first implemented, as opposed to either
starting with more realistic and complex baseline assumptions, or else
sharply limiting the scope of the analysis to only assessing the
consequences of the policy for those persons already in existence when that
policy is implemented.5 Cost-benefit analysis starting from conventional
baseline assumptions is particularly poorly suited as an approach for
assessing climate regulation policies, since a crucial aspect of those policies
is their impact upon the welfare of future persons not yet conceived when
the policies are first implemented.6
The problem here is that cost-benefit analysts consistently overlook
the crucial fact that the fundamental genetic identities of the members of
future generations are endogenous rather than exogenous with regard to the
policies being evaluated.7 Put another way, when a policy is implemented
it will not only impact the wealth of the members of future generations, but
4. See Gregory S. Crespi, A Brief Reflection on the Problem of Person-Altering
Consequences, 2 J. APP. ECON. 13, 13–22 (2009) [hereinafter Crespi, A Brief Reflection]
(discussing the existence of trade-offs and difficult ethical questions that are far too often
overlooked by policy makers); Gregory S. Crespi, The Fatal Flaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis:
The Problem of Person-Altering Consequences, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10703, 10705 (2008) [hereinafter Crespi, The Fatal Flaw] (criticizing the conventional costbenefit analyses that consistently ignore the pervasive and dramatic person-altering
consequences of policies); Gregory S. Crespi, What’s Wrong with Dumping Radioactive
Wastes in the Ocean? The Surprising Ethical and Policy Analysis Implications of PersonAltering Consequences, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10873, 10873 (2007)
[hereinafter Crespi, What’s Wrong] (discussing how policy decisions have person-altering
consequences and so we have no ethical obligations to future generations who have had their
genetic identities significantly altered by those person-altering consequences, since any
policy that we might pursue would be a necessary condition of future generation‘s
existence).
5. See Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 13–22 (discussing the existence
trade-offs and the difficult ethical question that is far too often overlooked by policy
makers); Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra note 4 at 10706–09 (criticizing the conventional
cost-benefit analyses that consistently ignore the pervasive and dramatic person-altering
consequences of policies); Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10873 (discussing how
policy decisions have person-altering consequences and so we have no ethical obligations to
future generations who have had their genetic identities significantly altered by those personaltering consequences, since any policy that we might pursue would be a necessary condition
of future generation‘s existence).
6. See Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10705 (criticizing the conventional
cost-benefit analyses).
7. Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 14 (2009); Crespi, What’s Wrong,
supra note 4, at 10880. See Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10708–09 (2008)
(criticizing the conventional cost-benefit analyses).
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will also, after a relatively short transitional period, even determine who
those persons are, i.e., determine the genetic identities of all future persons.8
The conventional working assumption almost always utilized when
conducting cost-benefit analyses, generally implicitly rather than explicitly
stated and defended, is that the same future persons with the same genetic
endowments will come into existence whether or not a policy is
implemented.9 Under this simplifying assumption the impacts of a policy
upon the welfare of those future persons can be measured by comparing the
circumstances that they will face if the policy is implemented with the
baseline scenario of the circumstances that they will instead face if the
policy is not implemented, and then valuing these differences as benefits (or
costs) in accordance with those future persons‘ estimated willingness to pay
to enjoy (or to avoid) those policy impacts.10
Embrace of the simplifying assumption that genetic identity is
exogenous—that the genetic identities of future persons will be unaffected
by the policies pursued, which will only affect their wealth—certainly has
the advantage that it greatly facilitates assigning valuations to policy
consequences, but it is unfortunately an untenable assumption.11 This
assumption is demonstrably false and moreover drastically changes the
valuations that are assigned to future policy consequences from what they
would have been had they been assessed with regard to a more realistic
baseline scenario.12 The results of a cost-benefit analysis that is done in
accordance with this simplifying assumption are therefore essentially
irrelevant to the real choices at hand.13 Unfortunately for cost-benefit
analysis, however, the other horn of this dilemma is that if one incorporates
the far more realistic recognition of the endogeniety of genetic identity this
leads to valuations of policy impacts that are so massively large and so
speculative and imprecise as to make any comparisons across policies
essentially meaningless.14 The results of the analyses then will not provide
helpful guidance to policy makers, regardless of how rigorously and
carefully the valuation calculations are carried out, and regardless of what

8. Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 15–16; Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra
note 4, at 10708–09; Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10880.
9. Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 15–16; Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra
note 4, at 10710; Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10878.
10. Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 15–16; Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra
note 4, at 10710; Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10879.
11. See Gregory S. Crespi, How Recognizing the Endogeniety of Identity Renders the
Discounting Debate Largely Irrelevant, 30 J. LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 75, 75 (2010)
(discussing how the typical cost benefit analyses overlook the important endogenous person
altering consequences).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 120.
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discount rates are then utilized to convert future policy impacts to present
value figures.15
The problem posed by the endogeniety of identity is quite daunting,
and perhaps even fatal, for the usefulness of the cost-benefit methodology.16
I have written extensively about the significance of the endogeniety of
identity problem for cost-benefit analysis and, more generally, for any
purely consequentialist evaluative framework that attempts to assess
policies solely by considering their consequences for the persons they will
affect.17 In Part II of this article I will first describe this endogeniety of
identity problem in greater detail, and then discuss how it renders the costbenefit methodology particularly unsuitable for the evaluation of climate
regulation policies.18
To illustrate my point about the conceptual deficiencies of recent
scholarly efforts to improve the application of cost-benefit analysis to
climate regulation policy, efforts that do not take into account the
endogeniety of identity, I will in Part III of this article briefly discuss a few
recent and representative examples of climate regulation/cost-benefit
analysis scholarship that have been carried out by some of the leading
researchers in the area, and that all exhibit this same shortcoming. I will
first consider two recent SSRN working papers. One of these papers is by
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner of the University of Chicago, and
addresses the question of determining the social cost of carbon emissions,19
The other paper is by Richard Revesz and Matthew Shahabian of the
N.Y.U. Law School, and addresses the more general question of how to
properly discount the future policy impacts of various regulatory
15. Id. at 121.
16. See Gregory S. Crespi, The Endogeniety Problem in Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Valuing Policies that Alter Preferences or Genetic Identities, 8 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y. 91,
118 (2010) (explaining the problem of endogeniety of identity).
17. See Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing how person-altering
consequences render the conventional cost-benefit framework useless); Crespi, The Fatal
Flaw, supra note 4, at 10703–16 (analyzing the controversy over cost-benefit analysis‘s
ability to access programs and policies); Crespi supra note 11, at 75 (demonstrating that
there is much less at stake than generally realized in the debates regarding how to
commensurate the adverse impacts upon existing persons with beneficial impacts upon the
members of future generations); Gregory S. Crespi, Incorporating Endogenous Preferences
in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 179–88 (2009) (elaborating upon
an internal critique of the cost-benefit methodology that has significant implications for the
assessment of policy consequences by the willingness to pay yardstick); id. at 118–32
(discussing how the endogeniety of identity is a more serious problem than the endogeniety
of preferences); Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10884 (acknowledging past
contributions on the problem of person altering consequences).
18. See sources cited infra note 26 (discussing the endogeneity of identity problem and
the different cost analyses and the impact on the environment).
19. See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 3–4 (illustrating the social costs of carbon
emissions).
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alternatives to present values for comparison with their current costs.20 I
will then discuss a recent report by Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth Stanton
of the Stockholm Environment Institute that was done for the Economics
for Equity and the Environment Network, and which also addresses the
social cost of carbon emissions and the question of determining appropriate
discount rates.21 Part IV will present a brief overall conclusion.
II. The Endogeneity of Identity
The noted British philosopher Derek Parfit first articulated in 197622 a
simple yet profound insight that philosophers have since labeled the "nonidentity problem,"23 and which I will refer to in this article as the
20. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 79–82 (expounding on the different
discounting methods and comparing them).
21. See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 11–17 (discussing the social cost of
carbon and different discount rates and proposing a method of calculation).
22. See Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in ETHICS AND POPULATION
100–15 (M. Bayles, ed. 1976) [hereinafter Parfit, On Doing the Best] (discussing the
problems with Narveson‘s person-affecting principle and the differences between policies
and how they affect us in the short term and long term); see also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS
AND PERSONS 351–80 (1984) [hereinafter PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS] (developing his
insights); Gregory S. Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 93, 93–
112 (1982) (arguing that Parfit‘s insight was also discovered independently at approximately
the same time by Robert Adams and by Thomas Schwartz and citing Robert M. Adams,
Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil, 13 NOÛS 53, 57 (1979) (discussing God‘s
decisions in creating and evaluating actions that shape the future), and also citing Thomas
Schwartz, Obligations to Posterity, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 3–13 (Richard
Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978) (arguing that there‘s no obligation to distant descendants to
limit population growth); Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 832, 854 (1986) [hereinafter
Parfit, Comments] (discussing the Non-Identity Problem); Derek Parfit, Future Generations,
Further Problems, 11 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 113, 115–17 (1982) [hereinafter Parfit, Future
Generations] (expanding on his insights).
23. See, e.g., PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 378 (labeling the
problem as the Non-Identity Problem and it is generally so described by other academic
philosophers); Anthony D‘Amato, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next?
An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Do We Owe a Duty to Future
Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?, 84 A.J.I.L. 190, 191 (1990) (regarding
Parfit‘s paradox, it may be preferable to pose the problem as a non-paradoxical though
difficult question of determining the ethical and policy valuation implications of policies that
have among their other long-term effects pervasive endogeniety of identity consequences);
Kavka, supra note 22, at 95 (describing the problem as the Parfit Paradox); Doran Smolkin,
Towards a Rights-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem, 30 J. SOC. PHIL. 194, 194
(1999) (illustrating through examples the non-identity problem); David Wasserman, The
Nonidentity Problem, Disability, and the Role Morality of Prospective Parents, 116 ETHICS
132, 132–33 (2005) (following Hanser and discussing the duties of prospective parents). See
Lothar Gundling, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to
Global Environmental Responsibility: Our Responsibility to Future Generations, 84 A.J.I.L.
207, 210 (1990) (referring to this insight as "Parfit‘s paradox"); Edith Brown Weiss, What
Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental
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recognition of the endogeneity of identity.24 Once one recognizes that
identity is endogenous, the inadequacy of any analysis of policy impacts
that overlooks this fact is quite clear, although as I will discuss below it is
difficult if not impossible to conduct analyses that do meaningfully
incorporate the endogeniety of identity. While the endogeniety of identity
has fostered substantial (though inconclusive) discussion among
philosophers and other scholars over the last three decades at an abstract,
academic level regarding its ethical significance,25 its dramatic practical
implications for policymakers in general and cost-benefit analysts in
particular have not yet been adequately appreciated.26
Responsibility: Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84
A.J.I.L. 198, 204 (1990) (referring to this insight as "Derek Parfit‘s famous paradox").
24. In my opinion, Parfit‘s Non-Identity Problem label obscures somewhat the precise
nature of the problem for those who are not academic philosophers and are not familiar with
the problem and the body of scholarship that it has engendered. I therefore will use in this
article the more straightforward descriptive phrase endogeneity of identity.
25. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 22, at 57 (discussing God‘s decisions in creation and
evaluating actions that shape the future); Ori J. Herstein, Historic Injustice and the NonIdentity Problem: The Limitations of the Subsequent-Wrong Solution and Towards a New
Solution, 27 LAW & PHIL. 505, 505–31 (2008) (detailing the problems more recently);
Kavka, supra note 22, at 93–95 (discussing why we are under no moral obligation to future
people to pursue controlled growth policies in order to promote their well-being); Schwartz,
supra note 22, at 3–4 (arguing that there‘s no obligation to distant descendants to limit
population growth); Smolkin, supra note 23, at 194 (illustrating through examples the nonidentity problem). See Joanna Pasek, Environmental Policy and ‘The Identity Problem’ 1–2
(CSERGE Working Paper GEC 93-13, 2008) (arguing that the identity problem follows
logically from assumptions concerning the concepts of harm and personal identity.); James
Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804, 804–31 (1986) (discussing Derek
Parfit‘s treatment of the Non-Identity Problem in part 4 of REASONS AND PERSONS).
26. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem and
Legal Liability, 60 HAST. L. J. 347, 348 (2008) (discussing the problems with Smolensky‘s
arguments in her article); Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 7 (2007) (seeking to define the procreative right); Michael Laudor, In
Defense of Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory to the Defense of a Tort, 62 FORD. L.
REV. 1675, 1676 (1994) (focusing on problems of future interests, the problems inherent in
one standard conception of harm, Parfit‘s solution and his recognition of the shortcomings of
the conception of harm, the failures of some attempts to reformulate utilitarianism, and the
roots of the problems of future people‘s interests); Lukas H. Meyer, The Palestinian
Refugees and the Right of Return: Theoretical Perspectives: Historical Injustice and the
Right of Return, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 305, 307–11 (2004) (considering the significance of
the endogeniety of identity for the validity of the claims made by the descendants of
displaced Palestinian refugees for a right to return to their ancestral homeland); Phillip G.
Peters, Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive Technology,
8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 376 (1999) (exploring an alternative way of determining
whether an existence inducing act is harmful to children); Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay
for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1390 (2002) (discussing the practical implications on
policy-makers as well as the effect on insurance arrangements as a result of choosing genes);
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2004) (arguing that even if children are not harmed, other effects or
implications of the situation may be relevant in making professional and policy decisions
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In this short article I will not attempt to fully articulate or resolve the
complex philosophical arguments that have been offered regarding the
implications of the endogeniety of identity, although I will reference much
of that literature for those philosophically-oriented readers who wish to
later explore this problem in a more comprehensive fashion.27 I will instead
discuss the problem in a more condensed and straightforward manner that is
intended to be helpful to lawyers, public policy analysts, and academics in
other fields who are not deeply versed in these technical philosophical
debates, but who nevertheless wish to better understand the endogeniety of
identity and its devastating implications for the wisdom of using of costbenefit analyses for guidance in climate regulation policy.
Parfit has clearly been the primary instigator of and contributor to
discussions of the difficulties involved dealing with the endogeniety of
identity through several works that he published over the 1976–1986

about them); Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the
Case for Reparations, 22 J. L. & POLITICS 183, 190–91 (2006) (considering the significance
of endogeniety of identity consequences for the validity of the claims made by the
descendants of slaves for reparations payments); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating
Children with Disabilities:
Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic
Interventions, 60 HAST. L. J. 299, 300–01 (2008) (examining both intentional tort claims and
ordinary negligence claims in the context of preimplantation genetic choices and concluding
that intentional tort claims from PSD should not be allowed because Parfit's Non-Identity
Problem prohibits the finding of a legally cognizable injury). See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECOPRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 151
n.38 (1999); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Justice Unconceived: How Posterity Has Rights, 14
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393, 397 (2002) ("[T]he topic of future generations‘ rights has
spawned a growing literature—or, rather, at least two separate literatures, one in law and the
other in philosophy, with very little interaction between the two."); Daniel Farber and Jeffrey
Gaba, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 289, 302 n.69 (2003) (citing quotes made by Derek Parfit on this topic and addressing
the problem of endogeniety of identity at least tangentially); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental
Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future Generations: Future Rights and Present
Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 258 n.24 (1999) (referring to Anthony D‘Amato, Do We
Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L.
190 (1990) (restating argument first put forth by Derek Parfit in Parfit, On Doing the Best
for Our Children, in ETHICS &POPULATION 100 (M. Bayles ed. 1976))); sources cited supra
note 17 (citing several articles where I have attempted to contribute to such a fuller
assessment, addressing some of the implications of the problem of the endogeniety of
identity, but that literature fails to fully incorporate the insights of the philosophers who have
addressed the matter). See also, Douglas Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and
Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006) (recognizing that this
problem does pose "deep conceptual challenges" to any analytical method such as costbenefit analysis "that is framed in terms of the rights, preferences, or interests of particular
individuals").
27. See Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10873–77 (discussing a more
comprehensive review of this literature).
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decade.28 The most significant of these efforts were his seminal 1976
article29 and his more comprehensive 1984 book Reasons and Persons,30
but he has also made other contributions to this debate.31 Parfit‘s seminal
insight is that virtually any human action, however slight its initial impacts
on the actor or on other persons, is likely to have at least minor indirect
effects on the precise timing of or other circumstances surrounding some
successful acts of sexual reproduction.32 Given the radically contingent
nature of a particular sperm-egg union, these effects will lead to different
sperm-egg fertilizations occurring than would otherwise have taken place,
and to the subsequent birth of now genetically different persons with
different physical endowments and temperaments from those of the persons
that would otherwise have been born.33 These differences will over time
lead to exponentially cascading consequences of a genetic identity-altering
nature, as these genetically different individuals mature and lead their
unique lives and influence the sexual and other behavior of a broader and
broader circle of people, leading indirectly to the alteration of the genetic
endowments of larger and larger numbers of later conceived persons.34

28. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 351–80; Parfit, Comments,
supra note 22, at 854; Parfit, Future Generations, supra note 22, at 115–17; Parfit, On
Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 100–15.
29. See Parfit, On Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 100–02 (using the hypothetical of
a woman deciding whether to postpone pregnancy due to an illness that would result in her
child being born with a handicap to illustrate the endogeniety of identity consequences of
policies on the people who will be born as a result of those policies).
30. See PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 351–79 (claiming that it
may be possible to formulate a valuation approach that appropriately addresses the problem
of the endogeniety of identity, and which can justify moral condemnation even of policies
that hurt no one).
31. See Parfit, Comments, supra note 22, at 854 (conceding that he was unable to
formulate the needed new theory about beneficence that would justify the No Difference
View conclusion). This 1986 article was included in an 1986 ETHICS symposium issue
focusing on his 1984 book REASONS AND PERSONS, and which also included contributions
by Brian Barry, Susan Wolf, Bart Schultz, Shelly Kagan, Bart Gruzalski, Arthur Kuflik and
James Woodward. In that article Parfit responded in detail to each of the other symposium
contributors‘ comments on his 1984 book. In particular, Parfit responded in some detail to
James Woodward‘s article, James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804,
804–31 (1986) (specifically focusing on the Non-Identity Problem); Parfit, Future
Generations, supra note 22, at 171–72; see also Parfit, Comments, supra note 22, at 854–62
(concluding that policies with person-altering consequences simply cannot be properly
evaluated on the basis of whether the results of those policies are better or worse for the
rights or interests of future persons).
32. See D‘Amato, supra note 23, at 190–92 (discussing Parfit‘s paradox and
concluding that any attempted altruism on our part to intervene in the environment to help
future persons will make those persons incomparably worse off than if we had not
intervened).
33. Id. at 191.
34. Id.
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Parfit‘s insight is rather obvious and hard to disagree with once it is
understood, as are many of the more important intellectual achievements of
human history, but its consequences for policy analysis are more subtle yet
truly momentous. Any social policy that is significant enough in its direct
or indirect impact on human behavior to lead to even a single different
sperm-egg fusion taking place will create a genetically different individual
than the person that would have been born absent the implementation of the
policy.35 Even the most minor and local policy will surely have that much
impact on someone‘s behavior.36 And over time, as that now genetically
different individual is born and matures and over their life influences
numerous other people in major or minor ways, this will result in an
exponentially spreading cascade of fundamental genetic changes in the
population of individuals subsequently conceived.37 After a relatively short
transitional period, in a historical sense, of probably no more than a few
decades at the most the genetic identity of all individuals that are conceived
and born over the rest of eternity will be fundamentally different from what
it would have been in the absence of the policy.38 The policy will thus have
changed the identity of all of those future persons; they will be different
people in the most fundamental genetic sense.39 The entire human
population for the rest of eternity will now be composed of individuals that
have significantly different genetic endowments from the genetic
endowments of those persons that would have come into existence absent
that initial action that first led to perhaps only a single different individual
being conceived.40
Think about this conundrum for a moment. One rather dramatic
impact of virtually any policy measure will thus be the elimination of all
members of the population of distant future generations that would have
been conceived and born absent the implementation of the policy, and their
replacement by an entirely different group of people. Stated more
succinctly, the genetic identity of all future persons after a relatively short
transitional period is endogenous to the policies pursued. From the
perspective of those affected, both those persons who will now be
conceived and born as a consequence of the policy, and those "persons," if
they can be so described, who as another consequence of the policy will
now never come into existence, there could not be a more dramatic
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. (discussing how rapidly the endogeniety of identity consequences of a
policy will proliferate, and how quickly the genetic divergence will be large enough to be of
major significance to the personal identities of the persons affected, will differ from policy
to policy).
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impact.41 These endogeniety of identity consequences will completely
dwarf in significance for these persons the combined effect of all other
policy consequences.42 These genetic identity consequences as well as the
other consequences of a policy therefore obviously need to be taken into
account in any comprehensive assessment of its merits, whether that
assessment is done through the cost-benefit methodology or otherwise.
Parfit‘s insight is clearly correct, as a matter of scientific fact,43 and is
an example of what is commonly referred to as the "butterfly effect" of
chaos theory44 where small perturbations in initial conditions can lead to
massive overall systemic effects.45 Parfit was primarily concerned in his
philosophical work on the endogeniety of identity with assessing its ethical
implications, which he understandably found to be quite disturbing.46 In
41. See id. (describing how future persons and those who will never come into
existence are both affected by changes in the environment).
42. See id. (implying that because endogeneity of identity consequences determine
whether or not a person will exist, they are of utmost importance).
43. See id. at 192 (noting that Parfit‘s theory is "scientifically accurate, stemming from
the discovery in recent years of chaos theory"). This conclusion assumes, of course, that a
person‘s identity is determined by their genetic endowment, or by the physical and cultural
circumstances of their lives, or both, rather than determined by some kind of ethereal
Cartesian ego or "soul" that is wholly independent of genetic characteristics or physical or
cultural influences. I will assume for the purposes of this article that if the genetic
endowment of a person is significantly altered as a consequence of a policy this can be
regarded as a change in that person‘s fundamental identity, whereas any consequence of a
policy that does not significantly alter a person‘s genetic endowment, no matter how
significant that consequence otherwise is to that person‘s life, does not change the
fundamental identity of that person.
44. See id. at 190–92 ("An environmental intervention as slight as a butterfly flapping
its wings near a weather station will change long-term weather predictions.").
45. See id. at 191 (describing how "our intervention in the environment will make a
sufficient impact to assure that different sperm cells will probably fertilize the egg cells in all
procreations that take place subsequent to our environmental intervention").
46. Parfit himself is obviously most uncomfortable with the unavoidable implication
of his insight that current policies that favor existing persons but that have adverse or even
disastrous impacts upon future persons would nevertheless be regarded as beneficial by
those future persons relative to their alternative of nonexistence if the policy is not pursued,
and thus those policies cannot be criticized on the usual person-affecting basis that they
would injure particular people. See Parfit, On Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 102 ("[T]he
long-term effects of social policies, even if clearly disastrous . . . won‘t be worse for
particular people. They are thus ignored. . . . a ‗person-affecting‘ principle gives to the
further future no weight. This seems indefensible."). Parfit thus demonstrates that he
understands the serious problem posed by endogeniety of identity consequences for any
utilitarian criterion or related measure such as the Kaldor-Hicks wealth-maximization
criterion that attempts to aggregate in some fashion the impacts of policies upon the affected
persons. See id. at 100 ("Such difficulties [posed by person-altering consequences] may
seem to face only utilitarians. This is not so. They face most of those who give any weight
to a utilitarian principle."). He is unfortunately somewhat opaque in this brief 1976 essay
regarding how this problem should be resolved. He clearly rejects the alternative of simply
ignoring the exponentially cascading endogeniety of identity consequences that will
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this article, however, I will focus instead upon the implications of the
endogeniety of identity for the conduct of cost-benefit analyses for
evaluating possible climate regulation policies.
In conventional cost-benefit analyses these important consequences of
policies for the genetic identity of future persons are invariably
overlooked.47 The typical cost-benefit analyst calculates both the benefits
and the costs of the policy at issue by the yardstick of the willingness to pay
of the affected persons, as compared to the reference point of a hypothetical
baseline scenario of a world in which the exact same persons will exist, but
without experiencing the policy‘s impacts.48
This methodology is
tantamount to an implicit assumption that personal identity is exogenous;
that the same future population of individuals will exist whether or not a
particular policy is implemented.49 But such an assumption is not merely
implausible but is demonstrably false, and is equivalent to simply ignoring
the fact of the endogeniety of identity.50 The calculation of costs and
benefits relative to an baseline reference scenario that arbitrarily and most
implausibly assumes that identity is exogenous renders the conclusions of
such an analysis irrelevant to the real choices at hand among the actual
consequences that are possible to achieve through the alternative policies
under consideration, given the fact of endogeniety of identity.51
It might at first appear that this analytical problem is manageable and
could be solved simply by more realistically specifying the hypothetical
generally occur when a policy is implemented, particularly given that the total number of
future persons that would be born will also likely be affected as well as their individual
identities. Id. at 103. He does state that the problem of endogeneiety of identity implies that
the long-term consequences of policies should not be determined by their impacts upon the
rights and interests of the affected future persons but he does not offer an alternative
valuation method. Id. at 102.
47. For example, a recent and otherwise rather comprehensive discussion of costbenefit analysis written by John Graham, who served as the Director of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget from
2001–2006, does not even mention the problems posed for the viability of cost-benefit
analysis by the endogeniety of identity. See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through
Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 403 (2008) (proposing that
benefit-cost analysis is an appropriate method for informing the promulgation of
regulations).
48. See id. at 412 (asserting that the original normative foundation for benefit-cost
analysis uses "‗willingness to pay‘ money as the measure of social benefit and ‗willingness
to accept‘ money as the measure of social cost").
49. See id. at 404 (offering approach to benefit-cost analysis that does not mention the
fact of the endogeneity of identity).
50. See D‘Amato, supra note 23, at 192 (asserting that endogeneity is a scientific fact).
51. See id. ("People encountering Parfit‘s thesis for the first time are properly skeptical
that a minor intervention in the environment can actually result in entirely different
individuals in 100 years . . . . But the result is scientifically accurate, stemming from the
discovery in recent years of chaos theory.").
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baseline scenario used as a reference point for valuing the impacts of the
policy at issue. This baseline scenario could, for example, be specified in a
manner that recognizes that different future persons would exist were the
policy to be implemented and generate its pervasive and eventually
universal gene-altering consequences for personal identities, consequences
that would not exist were the policy not to be implemented. The valuations
of policy impacts would then be calculated in a much more accurate fashion
with reference to the actual alternative of non-existence for the persons
impacted had the policy not been implemented. Unfortunately, a little
further reflection suggests that the problem is not so easily fixable.
Once a cost-benefit analyst eats of the apple of the tree of knowledge,
i.e., recognizes that all policies have pervasive and eventually universal
consequences for the genetic identities of future individuals, she is put into
in a real bind with no good choices available within the standard
methodological framework.52 Continuing to ignore those consequences,
given their overwhelming significance to the persons affected relative to all
other policy impacts, would be to disregard the comprehensive willingness
to pay valuation principle that underlies the cost-benefit approach, and is
not an option if one wants to reach results that are relevant to the actual
choices at hand.53 However, if one attempts to incorporate endogeniety of
identity consequences into the analysis one runs into the obstacle that there
does not appear to be any way to meaningfully estimate in a willingness to
pay-based manner the size of the massive benefits to future generations that
would result under each of the various policy options under consideration,
so as to provide useful guidance for choosing among them.54
Let me explain more fully the seemingly insurmountable measurement
problem that presents itself.55 It is immediately apparent that to evaluate
the merits of a policy that will have genetic identity-altering consequences
for future persons—which a little reflection reveals includes any policy
whatsoever given the inevitability of exponentially spreading genetic
consequences from even initially very minor effects—the endogeniety of
identity will have to be explicitly incorporated in some manner.56 The
52. See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10705 ("The basic analytical conundrum
presented is that if one attempts to so incorporate these person-altering consequences into a
cost-benefit analysis, rather than simply ignoring them, the valuation calculations become so
unwieldy and imprecise as to essentially be indeterminate.").
53. See id. ("In light of the seemingly insurmountable problems that the willingnessto-pay-based valuation framework faces in meaningfully assessing the significance of
person-altering consequences, it may simply be the case that cost benefit analysis should no
longer be regarded as a useful analytical tool.").
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 10709 (justifying incorporation of person-altering consequences into an
analysis because "it will not be adequate merely to apply a time discount to the policy‘s
future impacts, as is now done").
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justifications generally offered for discounting future impacts at an
appropriate discount rate are not necessarily affected by inclusion of these
consequences, but it is now also necessary to sharply differentiate between
the policy‘s future impacts upon existing persons57 over the rest of their
post-policy implementation lives, which do not include alteration of their
genetic identities, and the policy‘s impacts upon future persons,58 which
after a transitional period will include those genetic identity-altering
consequences.59
There are two distinct groups of future "persons" that will be affected
in fundamentally different ways by the consequences of a policy. There is,
first of all, the very large group of future persons who will actually be
conceived and born over the subsequent course of history as a result of
those consequences. For them, the implementation of the policy is a
necessary condition of their existence. Second, there is the vastly larger
group of what I will here refer to as "potential but now never to be
conceived future persons" who would have been conceived and born as a
consequence of our pursuing one or another of the potentially unlimited
number of alternative courses of action other than the policy at issue,
including the null option of taking no action, but who will not be conceived
if the policy at issue is implemented.60
It is rather obvious that the hypothetical preferences of this second
group of untold trillions of potential but now never to be conceived future
persons should not be given any weight in a cost-benefit analysis of the
policy at issue. With their very existence at stake, each of these future
persons would likely regard any specific policy—other than the single
policy that would result in their coming into existence—as imposing

57. By the term "existing persons" I mean to refer broadly to not only those persons
who are already born at the time of the policy in question‘s implementation, but also those
persons already conceived but not yet born at that time, as well as those members of the
"transitional generations" following the policy who were conceived after the implementation
of the policy and whose genetic identity has not yet been significantly altered by the
spreading endogeniety of identity consequences of the policy.
58. By the term "future persons" I mean to refer broadly to those persons conceived
after the implementation of the policy in question whose genetic identity has been
significantly altered by the spreading endogeniety of identity consequences of the policy.
For any policy there will be a transitional period of some length during which some but not
all persons born will have had their genetic identities fundamentally altered by the
consequences of the policy, before those consequences become universal in scope. See also
supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining the term "existing persons").
59. This paragraph and much of the following text builds upon George S. Crespi, The
Endogeneity Problem in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 91–145 (2010).
60. It is perhaps a misnomer to refer to these wholly imaginary "beings" that never
will come into existence as being "persons" in any sense whatsoever, but for lack of a better
descriptive phrase I will refer to them as such.
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immense costs upon them,61 resulting in a very large if not infinite
aggregate cost measure for any specific policy whatsoever that even if
heavily time-discounted would dominate any measure of benefits that is
utilized. This absurd result of the massive rejection of any course of action
whatsoever (including the null option of taking no action) indicates that it
would be a category mistake to accord standing to potential but now never
to be conceived future persons in an analysis of the consequences of a
policy that necessarily precludes their existence. The hypothetical
preferences of those future persons who have the potential to exist under
one policy alternative or another, but whose existence would be precluded
by the specific policy measure under consideration, should be ignored in
assessing that policy‘s effects.62

61. This is under the assumption that offer prices, a more conservative and constrained
measure of willingness to pay, are utilized as the approach for measuring willingness to pay.
These aggregate costs would likely be infinite if asking price measures rather than offer
price measures were utilized.
62. Jeffrey Gaba has insightfully likened this situation to the science fiction motif of
an infinite number of universes being generated each instant as our present decisions create
multiple alternative futures. Farber & Gaba, supra note 26, at 257 n.24. He also draws the
analogy to multi-universe interpretations of the probabilistic results of quantum physics. Id.
He concludes as do I that the adverse impacts of our policies upon this multitude of potential
but now never to be conceived persons should be ignored, though not for the reason that I
give that their inclusion in the analysis would lead to absurd results, but instead because their
competing interests should be regarded as "cancelling out;" cost-benefit analysis should in
effect be "renormalized" to eliminate such infinite values in a manner that parallels what
physicists do in their quantum mechanics equations. Id. Steven Landsburg, in his
entertaining book MORE SEX IS SAFER SEX, also addresses to a modest extent the question of
how to value the consequences of our actions for yet-unconceived future persons. STEVEN E.
LANDSBURG, MORE SEX IS SAFER SEX 238–43 (2007). Landsburg recognizes that our policy
choices raise moral questions with regard to their impacts upon yet-unconceived future
generations and that these questions are of practical significance for real-world
policymaking. See id. at 238, 243 ("Do we have any moral obligation to account for the
interests of trillions of potential people, who will never have the opportunity to live unless
we conceive them?"). He also recognizes the perhaps insurmountable difficulty of these
questions. Id. at 239 ("Perhaps [we should just admit] . . . that we‘re incapable of being
logically rigorous about issues involving the unconceived."). His analysis, however, appears
to regard unconceived future persons as comprising a single large group who can either be
conceived or not, depending on what course of action we pursue, rather than recognizing that
they actually constitute a vast multiplicity of alternative groups of persons extending through
time. See id. at 238–39 (referring to future persons generally as the "unconceived"). A
policy action leading the conception of one group would necessarily preclude the conception
of all of the other groups, necessitating the development of a framework for addressing these
stark intra-group conflicts of interest were any rights for unconceived persons to be
recognized. Landsburg does not address this difficulty, and consequently does not appear to
understand the full significance of endogeniety of identity consequences for policy analysis.
See id. at 238 (examining the issue of endogeneity in a perhaps more simplistic fashion: "Do
we have any moral obligation to account for the interests of trillions of potential people, who
will never have the opportunity to live unless we conceive them?").
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But what about the first group of future persons who will be conceived
and born post-policy with genetic endowments that are influenced by the
policy‘s spreading effects, for whom the policy‘s implementation is a
necessary condition of their existence? One would expect that at least the
overwhelming majority, if not all, of these future persons who would owe
their very existence to the implementation of a policy would, if given the
opportunity, assign very high offer prices63 to the policy even were that
policy to have some adverse or even catastrophic consequences for their
well-being. But these genetic identity-altering consequences of a policy
will persist and magnify for all eternity, and it is of course not knowable in
advance how many future persons from each era would exist to declare
their valuations in such a hypothetical referendum, let alone what the
wealth endowment and precise preference structure of each of these future
persons would be that would constrain the magnitude of their offer prices.
While it will therefore not be possible to precisely calculate these benefits
nor ascertain the distribution of the costs and benefits of a policy between
existing persons and future persons, it is clear that any policy whatsoever,
no matter how broadly catastrophic its long-term impacts, would result in
truly massive benefits for those future persons64 who otherwise would not
have been born, benefits that would, even if heavily time-discounted,
completely dominate the magnitude of any adverse impacts upon existing
persons65 for the obvious reason that all of the untold trillions of future
persons whose hypothetical preferences are being considered would owe
their very existence to the implementation of that policy.
So the result is that a cost-benefit analysis of any policy measure
whatsoever that takes into account the endogeniety of identity, regardless of
the nature of the policy‘s impacts upon existing persons, will result in
massive benefits of highly uncertain magnitude for the combined group of
existing persons and future persons. Of what use, if any, would such an
analysis be for policymakers in choosing among alternatives?
Consider, for example, a radically present-oriented proposal to put all
of our high-level radioactive wastes into ordinary steel barrels that will not
provide effective long-term containment beyond a century or two and then
dump them all overboard into the Pacific Ocean.66 This policy would free
63. And likely infinite asking prices if asking prices are the willingness to pay-based
measure utilized for the valuations.
64. This is true even if one uses more restrictive offer price measures that are limited
by people‘s wealth endowments, rather than potentially unlimited asking price measures of
these benefits.
65. I am assuming that future persons are psychologically similar to existing persons
in that they would essentially unanimously prefer life under even quite difficult
circumstances over non-existence.
66. This particular hypothetical is analyzed in some detail in my earlier articles on the
subject. See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10710–11 ("For those untold trillions of
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billions of dollars of resources now devoted each year to radioactive waste
storage efforts to be diverted to other pressing social needs.67 While those
future persons born several centuries from now and thereafter may well
suffer very significant adverse environmental consequences from such an
action, the multi-billion dollar current resource reallocations that such a
policy would allow would have cascading genetic identity-altering
consequences that would surely be universal in scope well before those
barrels began to leak their poisons.
As previously discussed, those potential but now never to be
conceived future persons who as a result of those resource reallocations will
not be born should not be accorded standing in a cost-benefit analysis of the
ocean waste dumping policy.68 The future persons that will be born as a
genetic identity-altering consequence of that ocean waste dumping policy
would owe their very existence to it. If they could be asked for their
opinions about the policy, if they are at all like existing persons in their
psychological make-up they would surely overwhelmingly (if not
unanimously) prefer coming into existence, even if their lives involved
grappling with a serious radioactive waste problem, to nonexistence. They
would of course much prefer existence without the radioactive waste
problem, were that an option that could be chosen, but the central insight
that comes from recognizing the endogeniety of identity is that this is not
possible.
The only choice that those future persons should be
hypothetically presented with for cost-benefit valuation purposes is the
bundled Hobson‘s Choice of life with the radioactive waste problem or
nonexistence, and if they are at all like existing persons given this choice
they would assign very large benefits to the policy, however those benefits
are assessed.
The ocean waste dumping policy will therefore be very favorably
judged by a cost-benefit analysis that incorporates the endogeneity of
identity, since at least most of the existing persons who will surely be dead
long before the wastes leak into the environment and cause adverse
biological consequences would be on balance be net beneficiaries of the
large resource reallocations thereby made possible by the policy,69 and the
future persons whose identity will be affected by those consequences of a policy, the policy
is a necessary condition of their existence. Its impacts will thus be valued very highly by
those persons as against their actual alternative of non-existence."); Crespi, What’s Wrong,
supra note 4, at 10873, 10881 ("These future persons that will be born as a consequence of
that ocean dumping policy would owe their very existence to it.").
67. See Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 108703 (noting who dumping nuclear
waste into the Pacific Ocean in reinforced steel barrels would save billions of dollars).
68. Supra note 60 and accompanying text.
69. I concede that there may well be existing persons who empathize sufficiently with
the environmental problems that the ocean waste dumping policy may cause for the
members of distant future generations that they would regard the policy as imposing net
costs on themselves, despite the more immediate and tangible benefits that may accrue to
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long parade of generations of future persons for whom the policy is a
necessary condition of their existence could be plausibly assumed to chime
in with declarations of truly massive benefits, although of very uncertain
magnitude in the aggregate. As I have already made clear, however, any
other policy proposal would also receive a ringing endorsement, even those
policies that are broadly disfavored by existing persons, since the costbenefit calculations would invariably be dominated by the benefits resulting
for the vast horde of members of distant future generations for whom the
particular policy at issue would be a necessary condition of their existence.
As another example particularly relevant to the subject of this article,
consider any of a number of possible policies that would each impose in
some significant fashion limitations on fossil fuel use in order to reduce
carbon emissions, in an attempt to reduce long-term global warming. The
substantial current costs imposed by any of those policies would obviously
have significant and quickly universal consequences for the genetic
identities of future individuals.70 Each possible policy that might be
pursued would be a necessary condition of the existence of the particular
parade of the untold billions of future persons who would later conceived
and born as a consequence of that policy.71 Those persons would doubtless
each offer very large positive valuations of that policy, since their actual
alternative for comparison would be non-existence. These valuations in the
aggregate, even if heavily time-discounted to a much smaller present value
figure, would still certainly total gazillions of dollars and would completely
dominate the current costs imposed by the policy regardless of their
magnitude. Such an indiscriminate and imprecise blanket endorsement of
all policy options whatsoever, regardless of their current costs, obviously
would not provide climate regulation policymakers with any useful
guidance as to which of these various policies, if any, should be pursued.
The valuation problem posed for cost-benefit analysis by the
endogeniety of identity is thus squarely posed, and is revealed to perhaps be
insurmountable.72 For any policy measure whatsoever, for those untold
billions of future persons who will come into existence over time as a result
of the implementation of that particular policy the policy is a necessary
condition of their existence. Its impacts will thus be valued very highly by
those persons, as against their actual alternative of nonexistence. The
them from the resource allocation savings. However, I feel confident that on balance the net
costs this policy would impose on these unusually empathetic persons will be substantially
outweighed by the net benefits for the large number of existing persons whose empathetic
time horizons do not span as far into the future as several centuries or more.
70. Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
71. Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
72. See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10712 ("[A]ttempting to value those
person-altering consequences in the usual willingness-to-pay-based manner unfortunately
leads to the cost-benefit analysis ‗blowing up.‘").
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conventional practice of valuing the consequences of a policy as compared
to the hypothetical baseline scenario of a world in which those same
persons would exist, but without experiencing the policy‘s impacts, makes
no sense at all since such an alternative scenario under which those same
persons would still exist could not possibly occur. Willingness-to-paybased assessments of benefits for future persons that are derived in such a
fashion are completely arbitrary and irrelevant.
Moreover, assessments so derived are not only arbitrary but are also
likely to be biased downwards, in some instances dramatically so. This is
because for some policies (such as the ocean waste dumping hypothetical
that I have discussed above) many future persons would presumably
strongly prefer the unattainable scenario in which they are presumed to still
exist, but without experiencing the adverse impacts of the policy at issue, as
compared to the world that would actually result for them from the policy‘s
consequences.73 Under that particular hypothetical comparison those future
persons would then likely assign costs rather than very large benefits to the
policy‘s consequences, leading in the aggregate to a massive undervaluation
of the future effects of the policy as compared to its valuation if those future
persons were to assess it as against their actual alternative of nonexistence.
So the endogeniety of identity can no longer be credibly ignored in
policy assessment. But as noted the other horn of the dilemma is that costbenefit analyses that incorporate the endogeniety of identity, but still
attempt to value future consequences in the usual willingness to pay-based
manner, will generate unhelpful results since all policy options will now
result in truly massive future benefits74 that even if very heavily timediscounted will still completely dominate any adverse effects of any of the
policies upon existing persons.75 A valuation methodology that essentially
ignores adverse policy impacts on existing persons, no matter how
substantial they may be, is rather ridiculous. Moreover, those future
benefits are simply not measurable with sufficient precision to allow the
alternative policy options to be meaningfully compared and ranked.
My criticisms of cost-benefit analysis may appear somewhat harsh, but
I do not intend to suggest that cost-benefit analysts have been acting in
conscious bad faith when they have used inappropriate and irrelevant
baseline scenarios as the standard of comparison in their analyses. I believe
73. Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
74. This is true even if more constrained offer prices measures of willingness to pay
are utilized. Policies will clearly all result in infinite net benefits if asking price measures of
willingness to pay are utilized, given the endogeniety of identity.
75. See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10712 ("This endogeneity problem may
well be fatal to cost-benefit analysis . . . because of the pervasiveness and significance of
person-altering consequences meaningful policy recommendations cannot be formulated
solely on the basis of conventional secular and consequentialist ethical premises and their
willingness-to-pay-based valuation corollary . . . .").
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that their failure take into account the endogeniety of identity in their
analyses has been due primarily to their overlooking that fact, rather than
due to their deliberately and covertly choosing to ignore it in light of its
adverse consequences for the relevance of their methodology. There is
apparently a general lack of familiarity among cost-benefit analysts with the
work of Derek Parfit and other philosophers who have wrestled with the
implications of the endogeniety of identity. Nevertheless, it is high time
that it become more widely recognized that the endogeniety of identity
renders completely inapposite the use of cost-benefit analysis in any context
where one wants to take into account the impacts of policies on future
persons as well as on existing persons, which is of course very much the
case in evaluating climate regulation policies.
III. Some Recent Discussions of the Application of Cost-Benefit Analysis to
Climate Regulation
The essential defining feature of cost-benefit analysis is its use of a
willingness to pay metric for valuing the costs and benefits of the policy
under consideration.76 Recent scholarship that attempts to assess and
improve upon the application of cost-benefit analysis to the difficult
questions posed by climate regulation policies unfortunately consistently
overlooks the severe problem posed by the endogeniety of identity for
efforts to apply the willingness to pay valuation metric to evaluate the longterm future consequences of such policies.77 That work generally fails to
point out the inadequacy of cost-benefit analyses that try to avoid this
problem by explicitly or implicitly assuming that genetic identity is
exogenous with regard to the policies under consideration.78
I will discuss below three recent examples of this work that all
evidence this major shortcoming. First, I will consider two SSRN working
papers, one by Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner of the University of
Chicago that is titled Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis,79 and the other by Richard Revesz and Matthew Shahabian of the
NYU Law School and that is titled "Climate Change and Future
Generations."80 I will also consider a recent report by Frank Ackerman and
Elizabeth Stanton of the Stockholm Environment Institute, titled "The

76. Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Masur & Posner, Climate Regulation, supra note 1 (discussing how
cost-benefit analysis is particularly challenged by climate change regulation).
78. See id. (ignoring the issue of endogeneity).
79. Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
80. Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 3–4 (arguing that the risks of climate
change, proper discount rates, and existing studies justify a higher social cost of carbon than
the Obama Administration's estimate of $21 per ton).
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Social Cost of Carbon," that was done for the Economics for Equity and the
Environment Network.81
A. The Masur and Posner Paper
This recent SSRN working paper by Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner82
promises to be highly influential for several reasons. First of all, it
identifies and discusses a surprisingly large number of recent U.S. federal
government regulatory initiatives that have been undertaken to address the
global climate change implications of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gas emissions,83 and also discusses in some detail an important Office of
Management and Budget-sponsored Interagency Working Group report
regarding the social cost of carbon emissions84 that has influenced many of
these regulatory initiatives, and this report and most of these regulatory
initiatives have yet received little if any comment in the law review
literature.85 Second, it provides a thoughtful and powerful critique that
points out the inadequacies of the recent efforts of various government
regulatory agencies to utilize the technique of cost-benefit analysis to
establish the social cost of carbon emissions so as to provide a yardstick for
assessing the benefits of various regulatory restraints on such emissions. 86
Finally, Eric Posner is a widely read and highly respected scholar in this
area, and his pronouncements will certainly be influential in shaping the
subsequent academic and regulatory discourse.87
81. ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 1 (evaluating justifications for
intergenerational discounting, finding that such discounting diverges from financial market
analysis, and recognizing the importance of moral theory in climate change decisions).
82. See Masur & Posner, supra note 1 (discussing climate change in an article
available on the Social Science Research Network ("SSRN")).
83. See id. at 2 (introducing some recent actions taken by the U.S. federal government
regarding climate change policy).
84. See id. at 4, 12–15 (analyzing recent studies concerning the social cost of carbon
emissions and climate change).
85. See id. at 2 (describing various regulatory activities of the U.S. federal government
regarding climate change and the scholarly reaction to those activities).
86. See id. at 17–32 (criticizing recent governmental efforts to use cost-benefit
analysis in regulating carbon emissions).
87. See e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 1–9 (2006) (describing cost-benefit analysis); Matthew D. Adler & Eric
A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEG.
STUD. 1105, 1105–08 (2000) (criticizing some cost-benefit analysis methodologies);
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165,
167–69 (1999) (arguing for a new approach to the use of cost-benefit analysis); Jonathan A.
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 657–62
(2010) (criticizing feasibility analysis); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with CostBenefit Analysis, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1137–42 (2001) (discussing the use of costbenefit analysis in policy-making); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 537–43 (2005) (analyzing the downsides of cost-benefit analysis).
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Masur and Posner's overall assessment of U.S. government efforts to
utilize cost-benefit analysis to guide climate regulation initiatives is
knowledgeable and sympathetic, but is on balance relatively critical.88
They are generally supportive in principle of the use of cost-benefit
methodology for routine administrative policy evaluation, although they are
well aware of and responsive to many of the various criticisms that have
been directed at that approach.89 They conclude, however, that U.S.
regulatory agencies have been evasive in their analyses of climate
regulation policies in that they have generally offered only a very broad
range of estimates for the social costs of carbon emissions, rather than
advancing a more useful and definitive point estimate, and moreover have
then subsequently largely disregarded their own calculations when
assessing their regulatory initiatives.90 They also conclude that those
agencies have failed to address a number of serious political issues that
arise in such cost-benefit analyses with regard to valuing the impacts of
climate regulations due to the global nature of climate change,91 and that
further Congressional or Presidential Executive Order action is necessary to
resolve these political questions and allow the agencies to focus their efforts
on addressing the difficult technical problems that are involved in
accurately establishing the social cost of carbon emissions.92
Masur and Posner‘s paper provides a very useful late-2010 snapshot of
U.S. regulatory efforts to address the problem of carbon dioxide emissions
and their climate change implications, and their critique of the ways in
which cost-benefit analyses have been conducted and their results applied
in this area is insightful.93 Unfortunately, however, their critique overlooks
the key point that all of the cost-benefit analyses that they refer to ignore
the fact of the endogeniety of genetic identity relative to the policies being
assessed, and that those analyses consequently reach results that are, as I
have discussed in Part II above, irrelevant to the real choices at hand.94 By
not calling attention to this severe deficiency, Masur and Posner also
implicitly accept without defending the legitimacy of the conventional cost88. See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 17 (describing the U.S. government‘s
climate change policies).
89. See id. at 17, 32–34 (analyzing the pros and cons of cost-benefit analysis in
government policy-making).
90. See id. at 4, 15–16, 35 (discussing the U.S. government‘s analysis of the social
costs of carbon emissions and the regulation thereof).
91. See id. at 25–35 (describing the political issues surrounding climate change
policy).
92. See id. at 25–35 (criticizing the U.S. government‘s response to global climate
change and recommending a course of action for the U.S. government).
93. See id. at 6–16 (describing the U.S. federal government‘s recent regulations of
carbon emissions).
94. See id. at 32–34 (criticizing the cost-benefit analysis methodology currently being
employed in climate change policy).
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benefit valuation framework that rests upon comparing policy consequences
with a demonstrably unattainable and thus completely arbitrary and
irrelevant baseline scenario.95 All of their recommendations are directed
towards improving the accuracy of the cost-benefit valuations that are
calculated with regard to this baseline, and then making better and more
politically defensible use of these more accurate valuations.96
But as I have discussed above, the immense measurement error that is
introduced by an analyst initially making entirely wrong comparisons—by
their contrasting the consequences of a policy for future persons to an
arbitrary and unattainable baseline scenario that also assumes the existence
of those persons without the policy, rather than the actual alternative of
those future persons‘ non-existence if that policy is not pursued, given the
endogeniety of identity—is so large that it renders trivial any gains in
accuracy that might be obtained by making more technically accurate and
politically defensible valuations of these comparisons such as Masur and
Posner recommend.97 The cost-benefit studies that Masur and Posner
critique and seek to improve are all fundamentally flawed by their incorrect
initial assumptions as to the relevant comparisons, and this is a difficulty
that cannot be adequately addressed simply by obtaining more accurate
measurements of those inapt comparisons.98 This conventional cost-benefit
methodology that is utilized by regulatory agencies would continue to be
fatally flawed even if the substantial technical and political difficulties that
are presented by the application of this methodology to climate regulation,
and that are well described by Masur and Posner, were to be somehow
overcome.99
Masur and Posner‘s efforts would have been more helpful for
formulating sound climate regulation policies if had they first attempted to
put forward and justify modifications of the conventional cost-benefit
analytical framework sufficient to properly reflect the endogeniety of
identity, before then addressing the somewhat less difficult, although still
formidable, technical and political issues inherent in attempts to measure
the social cost of carbon once the proper framework of comparison has
been delineated. Alternatively, and more radically, they might have
advanced an entirely different normative framework for evaluating
proposed climate regulations that does not focus, as does cost-benefit
analysis, upon those regulations‘ impacts upon specific future persons and
thereby unavoidably raise these endogeniety of identity difficulties. I
95. See id. at 6–34 (analyzing the drawbacks of cost-benefit analysis in social policy).
96. See id. at 4–6 (outlining the objectives of Masur and Posner‘s paper).
97. See id. at 32–35 (recommending the U.S. government take a more accurate and
politically defensible cost-benefit analysis approach to climate change).
98. See id. at 32–34 (criticizing cost-benefit analysis methodologies).
99. See id. at 17–34 (discussing the numerous technical and political difficulties
underlying regulatory agencies' cost-benefit analyses of climate change).
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unfortunately do not have such a non-consequentialist evaluative
framework ready at hand to offer, and moreover I am rather skeptical
whether one can ever be developed that would obtain widespread support
across groups of persons with diverse philosophical and theological beliefs.
Nevertheless, it is clear that using conventional cost-benefit methodology,
with its implicit assumption that policies do not affect genetic identity, to
guide climate regulation policy, is simply not credible in light of the
demonstrable endogeniety of identity even were the severe measurement
and political difficulties presented by its application and well-described by
Masur and Posner to be adequately addressed.100
B. The Revesz and Shahabian Paper
This second SSRN working paper by Richard Revesz and Matthew
Shahabian also promises to significantly influence the climate regulation
policy debate.101 First of all, it provides a thoughtful and comprehensive
discussion of the analytical complexity and moral aspects involved in
discounting policy benefits to future generations relative to current costs
and benefits.102 The use of such intergenerational discounting is obviously
a critical aspect of any cost-benefit analysis that purports to compare the
long-term benefits for future persons of a climate regulation policy with its
current costs and benefits. Second, Richard Revesz is one of the world‘s
leading scholars with regard to the philosophical and practical questions
presented by attempts to discount future policy consequences, and his
thoughts on these questions as they arise in the climate regulation context
will certainly be given substantial weight by other important participants in
these discussions.103
Revesz and Shahabian argue that all of the current justifications
offered for discounting the costs and benefits of policies for future persons,
before those costs and benefits are then compared to the policies‘ current
costs and benefits, are fundamentally flawed in that they inadequately
reflect the nature and complexity of our moral obligations to future

100. See id. at 17–34 (describing the technical and political difficulties of using costbenefit analysis to develop climate change regulatory policy).
101. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the significance of the
author's work).
102. See id. (outlining Revesz and Shahabian‘s technical and moral criticisms of
discounting techniques).
103. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH
10–20 (2008) (discussing how cost-benefit analysis has become increasingly used by the
U.S. federal government); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 941–1017 (1999)
(criticizing the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation).
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generations.104 In their paper, they classify the justifications commonly
offered for discounting future costs and benefits at a specific discount rate
into one of four categories.105 The first category of justifications for such
discounting they label "prescriptive pure time preference discounting"
justifications, and these justifications are based upon the embrace of one or
another underlying ethical norm regarding the weight that current
generations should accord to the interests of future generations.106 The
second category they label "descriptive pure time preference discounting"
justifications, and these justifications are based upon empirical evidence
regarding the choices that people actually make between consumption and
savings for the future.107 Their third category, which they call ―opportunity
cost discounting‖ justifications, are justifications based upon consideration
of the opportunity costs involved in pursuing a particular policy.108 Finally,
what they label as ―growth discounting‖ justifications are those
justifications based upon the observation that since future generations are
very likely to be wealthier than current generations, even if those future
generations should be treated equally with current generations from an
ethical standpoint, discounting future benefits may still be justified on the
basis of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.109
Revesz and Shahabian consider and reject each of those justifications
for discounting future benefits as providing inadequate support for the use
of a specific discount rate in the context of the long-term effects of climate
regulation policies.110 Their analysis is extensive and merits a close
104. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 1 (introducing a moral critique of the
discounting methods currently employed by climate change policy-makers).
105. See id. at 4, 5–7 (outlining and comparing the alleged justifications for using
discounting methodology in climate change policy).
106. See id. at 9–12 (describing the first of three categories of justifications for using
discounting methodology in climate change policy).
107. See id. at 12–14 (describing the second of three categories of justifications for
using discounting methodology in climate change policy).
108. See id. at 15–16 (defining "opportunity costs" as the foregone benefits of a future
generation that will result from attempts to benefit that future generation through climate
change mitigation).
109. See id. at 14–15 (using a formula for the rising discount rate which equals the rate
at which per capita consumption grows multiplied by the elasticity of marginal utility gained
from an extra unit of consumption, which is a measure of society‘s "aversion to income
inequality").
110. See generally id. (summarizing each consideration and rejection of the various
justifications); infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text (same). They also briefly
discuss in their paper the concept of "hyperbolic" discounting, which is a method of
discounting whereby future benefits are discounted by a discount rate that gradually declines
over time, rather than by a conventional single discount rate that remains constant over time.
Id. at 17–22. However, they do not regard this form of discounting as resting upon
justifications that are independent of the four categories of justifications that they do discuss,
but only as a particular application of discounting that would also have to be defended by
one or another of those four possible categories of justifications. Id. at 22.
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reading, and I will not attempt to summarize their reasoning in this short
article. Their overall conclusions, however, can be succinctly stated. They
conclude that discounting benefits to future generations at any particular
discount rate merely because those persons will live in the future rather than
in the present is ethically indefensible,111 that the descriptive pure time
preference justification for discounting future benefits inappropriately
conflates intrapersonal savings choices with intergenerational decisions,112
that the opportunity cost discounting justification for discounting future
benefits ignores potential irreversibilities of climate change and the rising
costs of mitigation measures,113 and that the growth discounting
justification inappropriately conflates environmental goods with
consumption goods.114 Their overarching conclusion is that the choice of a
discount rate for a cost-benefit analysis that is based on one or more of
these justifications "cannot substitute for a moral theory setting forth our
obligations to future generations."115 This discount rate choice is, in their
view, not just a technical matter, but is a broader decision that has
fundamental, philosophical, and moral ramifications.116
The Revesz and Shabian paper presents a sophisticated analysis and
forceful critique of the various justifications that are usually offered (or just
implicitly assumed) for the choice of a particular discount rate when a costbenefit analyst attempts to compare the costs and benefits of a policy for
future generations with its current costs and benefits.117 However, the
relevance of their discount rate analysis to the issues presented by climate
regulation policy is unfortunately badly undercut by the fact that their
analysis is limited to considering the appropriate discount rates to apply to
discount the future benefits of a policy when those benefits are calculated
with regard to the conventional baseline scenario that assumes the
exogeniety of identity; that assumes that if the policy were not pursued then

111. See id. at 79 (arguing that "prescriptive pure time preference discounting is
inconsistent with moral intuitions and has little support even among economists").
112. See id. at 80 ("The savings rate is not useful as revealed preferences for how
society sees its obligations to the future—both because the savings rate does not capture all
intergenerational transfers and because of its wide disparity with stated preferences of our
obligations to future generations.").
113. See id. at 80–81 (explaining that certain investments may reduce mitigation costs;
however, "that may be more than offset if future generations are stuck with irreversible,
catastrophic damage, or are even forced simply to spend significantly more on climate
change mitigation in the future because current generations decided not to").
114. See id. at 81 (arguing that future generations are actually likely to value
environmental improvements more than current generations, and the discount formula
should be adjusted to reflect this).
115. Id. at 1; see also id. at 82 (discussing the same point in further detail).
116. Id. at 1.
117. See generally supra notes 104–113 and accompanying text (summarizing their
analysis and critique of these justifications).
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those same future persons would still come into existence, but now not
experience the impacts of the policy.118 They do not explicitly state and
defend the reasonableness of this exogeniety of identity assumption, but
their embrace of this assumption is implicit throughout their paper,119 and
while their work is otherwise comprehensively documented, they make no
attempt to rebut or even cite to the arguments offered by Derek Parfit and
others as to the endogeniety of identity and its implications.120
As I have discussed above, however, cost-benefit analyses that attempt
to value future benefits through making such an inapt comparison of a
policy‘s projected consequences with the reference point of an irrelevant
and demonstrably unattainable baseline scenario that wrongly presupposes
that genetic identity is exogenous will result in arbitrary, misleading, and
ultimately useless benefit measures.121 It is somewhat misguided to then
expend substantial efforts to determine how to most appropriately discount
such essentially meaningless future cost and benefit figures that have been
calculated at the outset through such a flawed measurement approach. The
consequences of a policy for future persons should first of all be valued
with regard to the actual alternative of those persons‘ non-existence, were
that policy not to be pursued. Only then can one meaningfully address the
also important but distinctly secondary questions of why and how those
future impacts should then be properly discounted, if at all, before their
aggregation with the current impacts of the policy.
118. See PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 351–79 (elaborating even
further on previous discussions that emphasize taking into account whether or not persons in
a future generation will exist because of the pursuit or non-pursuit of a particular policy
when determining whether that policy is morally defensible); Kavka, supra note 22, at 95–
96 (echoing Parfit‘s thesis concerning the flaw in assuming endogeneity of identity, but also
not labeling it as such); Parfit, Future Generations, supra note 22, at 171–72 (continuing his
earlier analysis and that of Kavka and ultimately concluding that a person-affecting principle
should not be used when determining the rightness or wrongness of a particular policy‘s
impact on a future generation); Parfit, On Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 100–09
(discussing the problems associated with assuming endogeneity of identity, but using a
different label for the term); see also discussion supra Part II (summarizing the concept of
endogeneity and why it should be assumed as the baseline scenario rather than exogeneity of
identity).
119. See generally Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2 (defending their critique of the
various justifications for discounting the rate at which the future benefits of a particular
climate change policy is converted to present value without accounting for persons who exist
solely as a result of not pursuing that particular policy).
120. See, e.g., PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22 at 351-81 (articulating and
defending the concept of endogeneity of identity, but using a different label for the term);
supra note 118 (same); but cf. Revesz & Shahabian supra note 2, at 41 n.148 (referring to
Derek Parfit‘s 1984 book REASONS AND PERSONS, but citing that work for other reasons, and
not for Parfit‘s discussion of the endogeniety of identity and its various ethical and analytical
implications).
121. See discussion supra pp. 238–239 and accompanying notes (discussing this point
in greater detail).

254

2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 227 (2011)

It would have been more helpful for formulating sound climate
regulation policies had Revesz and Shahabian focused their analysis of
discounting justifications122 upon the discounting of the estimates of future
costs and benefits that would be obtained under the far more realistic
assumption that those future persons impacted by a policy would never
have been conceived and born had the particular policy under consideration
not been implemented. Those aggregate benefits to those untold billions (or
even trillions) of future persons for whom the particular policy in question
is a necessary condition of their existence are obviously going to be truly
massive if measured by the usual cost-benefit analysis willingness to pay
metric (as will also be the benefits of pursuing the null option of taking no
action), and those benefits will consequently completely dominate the
current costs of that policy, even if those costs are quite large, unless very
high discount rates—such as, for example, triple-digit annual rates (!)—are
applied to those future benefits. The pressing cost-benefit analysis discount
rate question that therefore needs to be answered is whether one can justify
the use of such extremely high discount rates that would to reduce these
truly massive future benefits, when discounted, to a size roughly
commensurate with the current costs of various policies, so that the results
of cost-benefit analyses might then possibly provide some meaningful
discrimination among policy alternatives and as compared to the null option
of inaction. The implicit focus of Revesz and Shahabian‘s work, however,
is a much different and practically somewhat irrelevant question.123 Their
focus is on which, if any, of the various and far smaller single-digit annual
discount rates that are now commonly used in conventional cost-benefit
analyses can be somehow justified with regard to the long-term future
consequences of climate regulation policies,124 or whether instead the use of
a zero or near-zero discount rate is called for, when those future
consequences that are to be discounted have been measured against a
baseline scenario that assumes the exogeniety of identity.125 They are
122. See generally Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2 (examining discounting for time
preference on the basis of ethical norms, discounting for time preference because that is how
people treat the future, discounting because future generations will be richer, and
discounting because of opportunity costs); see also supra text accompanying notes 104–116
(summarizing their conclusions concerning the justifications for the various discount rates).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 118–121 (explaining the question on which
Revesz and Shahabian focus in their article); see also Crespi supra note 11, at 94
(concluding that since the future impact of policies will significantly alter the genetic
identities of members of future generations, discounting issues will only have minor
importance on valuations in the cost-benefit analysis and are therefore irrelevant).
124. See supra notes 105–114 and accompanying text (summarizing Revesz and
Shahabian‘s analysis of the justifications for these discount rates).
125. See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text (elaborating on the concept of
exogeneity of identity and discussing why using it as a baseline scenario for evaluating
justifications for discount rates is a flawed approach to the overall inquiry).
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particularly interested in focusing attention on two recent and influential
studies of climate change policy, THE STERN REVIEW: REPORT ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE,126 by Sir Nicholas Stern, and William
Nordhaus‘s A QUESTION OF BALANCE,127 that utilized very different singledigit annual discount rates,128 and consequently reached very different
recommendations as to what climate regulation measures would be costjustified.129 But the Stern and Nordhaus studies both incorrectly valued the
benefits of climate regulation measures under the implicit assumption of the
exogeniety of identity,130 so the question of whether either of these studies
then used an appropriate discount rate to adjust those radically incorrect
future cost and benefit valuations is not of great interest.131
While some of Revesz and Shahabain‘s analysis of the various
justifications offered for discounting future policy consequences132 may
well be relevant in some regards for answering the real question as to
whether very high discount rates can ever be justified to apply to the future
benefits of policies that are estimated under more realistic endogeniety of
identity assumptions,133 they unfortunately do not attempt to apply their
analysis in the context of those more realistic assumptions, so it is unclear
exactly what weight they would give to these various technical and moral
concerns that they raise in the very different context of an assumed
exogeniety of identity.134

126. See generally Sir Nicholas Stern, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE (2007) (discussing the effect of global warming on the world economy).
127. See generally William Nordhaus, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE
OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (2008) (analyzing the economic and ecological
dynamics of greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation efforts).
128. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 3, at 7 (observing that Stern advocates a low
discount rate and Nordhaus advocates a high discount rate).
129. See id. (observing that Stern advocates aggressive steps to stop climate change and
Norhaus advocates "a more measured response" to climate change).
130. See Nordhaus, supra note 72, at 165–91 (discussing his approach to discounting
benefits in assessing climate change policies without considering the identity of persons who
exist solely because a particular policy was or was not pursued); Stern, supra note 71, at 35–
37 (same).
131. See Crespi, supra note 1, at 94 (discussing that an analysis that assumes the
exogeneity of identity makes inquiries into various discount rates irrelevant); supra note 66
and accompanying text (overviewing Crespi‘s ocean dumping hypothetical).
132. See supra notes 105–114 and accompanying text (summarizing Revesz and
Shahabian‘s analysis on the various justifications for discounting future policy
consequences).
133. See supra Part II (providing a more detailed analysis of why assuming endogeneity
of identity is a more realistic assumption).
134. See supra text accompanying note 118 (defining the concept of exogeneity of
identity).
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C. The Ackerman and Stanton Report

The third illustrative example of recent climate regulation scholarship
that I would like to discuss and criticize is a short report titled ―The Social
Cost of Carbon‖ that was prepared by Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth
Stanton for the Economics for Equity and the Environmental Network. 135
This report should also be influential in policy circles because Frank
Ackerman, for a number of years, has been one of the leading critics of the
use of cost-benefit analysis to shape environmental policy.136
This report is in general accord with the two SSRN papers that I have
previously discussed in that it does not sweepingly reject the use of costbenefit analysis altogether in this context, a position that is somewhat
surprising given Ackerman‘s prior trenchant critiques of its application to
environmental issues.137 However, it is highly critical of the specific
valuation and discount rate assumptions that have been utilized in recent
governmental efforts to establish a social cost of carbon for use in
determining which climate regulation measures are cost-effective.138 It
primarily focuses its critique, as does the Masur and Posner paper, upon the
range of carbon cost estimates that were endorsed by the OMB-sponsored
Interagency Working Group.139 The report discusses and critiques the
several underlying climate models from which that Interagency Working
Group derived both its initial and later revised carbon cost estimates.140 It
also criticized the alternative 2.5%, 3% and 5% annual discount rates that

135. See generally ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1 (discussing and critiquing
government valuations of the social costs of carbon emissions in making climate regulation
policies).
136. See Frank Ackerman, et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. LAW. REV. 155, 157 (2005) ("In
practice, therefore, cost-benefit analysis is an opaque and technically intricate process
accessible only to experts, and one that all too frequently recommends rejection of sensible
policies, on the grounds that their costs exceed economists‘ estimates of their benefits.");
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2002) (―Cost-benefit analysis
differs, however, from other analytical approaches in the following respect: it demands that
the advantages and disadvantages of a regulatory policy be reduced, as far as possible, to
numbers, and then further reduced to dollars and cents. In this feature of cost-benefit
analysis lies its doom.‖).
137. See sources cited supra note 136 (illustrating the Ackerman and Stanton‘s
previous criticisms of cost-benefit analyses).
138. See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 8–15 (observing that since serious
anticipated damages from climate change cannot be quantified or monetized, estimates of
the social cost of carbon "may be too low or logically incomplete").
139. See id. at 6–7 (describing the agencies participating in the Working Group and
critiquing its estimates on the social costs of carbon).
140. See id. at 8–11 (arguing that the choice of three specific integrated assessment
models is arbitrary and biases the analysis).
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were endorsed by that Interagency Working Group,141 echoing the point
developed more fully by Revesz and Shahabian that the choice of a
discount rate to use for discounting policy impacts upon future generations
is an ethical judgment and not simply a technical matter of accurately
measuring ―market‖ discount rates, however they are defined.142
The aspect of this report that I want to emphasize here is that
Ackerman and Stanton, as do the Masur and Posner and Revesz and
Shahabian papers, implicitly accept the legitimacy of valuing the impacts of
climate regulation policies under the assumption of the exogeniety of
identity.143 They do not question the meaningfulness of measuring the
social costs of carbon emissions for the future persons affected by
comparing the impacts of those emissions to the hypothetical baseline
scenario of the circumstances that those exact same future persons would
face were climate regulation measures now taken to preclude some of those
carbon emissions.144 But once again, to admittedly belabor the simple point
that I have made with regard to both the Masur and Posner and Revesz and
Shahabian papers, given the endogeniety of identity this is a most inapt
comparison of policy consequences with an arbitrary and demonstrably
unattainable set of circumstances. The willingness to pay-based valuations
of the impacts of any policy upon the future persons who would experience
those impacts should instead be calculated as against the actual alternative
of those persons‘ non-existence were that policy not to be pursued.145 As I
noted before when discussing the Revesz and Shahabian paper, it is
premature and rather beside the point to call for incremental refinements in
valuation methods and/or discount rate choices as long as cost-benefit
analysts are not yet even making the proper comparisons.146
IV. Conclusion
The recent efforts by Masur and Posner, Revesz and Shahabian, and
Ackerman and Stanton are each knowledgeable and sophisticated attempts
to assess and improve the application of the cost-benefit methodology in the
141. See id. at 11–12 ("Casual estimates and unsupported judgments are used to justify
discount rates that are inappropriately high for analysis that spans several generations.").
142. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 1 (concluding that "discounting cannot
substitute for a moral theory setting forth our obligations to future generations").
143. See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
exogeneity of identity and how Revesz and Shahabian assume this concept as a baseline
scenario for their analysis of justifications for discounts rates).
144. See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing their conclusion
advocating a lower discount rate based on ethical grounds).
145. See discussion supra Part II and note 5 (summarizing this concept in more detail
and its background).
146. See supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing the irrelevance of analyzing
discount rates when assuming exogeneity of identity).
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climate regulation context. Unfortunately, however, these efforts each take
for granted the appropriateness of conducting cost-benefit analyses that
attempt to assess the impacts of policies upon future persons by comparing
the circumstances that those policies are projected to create for those future
persons with the circumstances that would be supposedly faced by those
same future persons were the policy not to be implemented. They each then
suggest various refinements in the methods by which those impacts are
quantified.147 However, once one recognizes the demonstrable fact that the
fundamental genetic identity of future persons is an endogenous variable
with regard to any policy under consideration, it is clear that the costbenefit methodology as conventionally applied with its implicit exogeniety
of identity assumption is fundamentally flawed in a way cannot be
remediated simply by more sophisticated valuation or discounting
techniques.148
Cost-benefit analysts and the scholars that critique their work both
need to recognize that the appropriate baseline comparison for valuing the
impacts of any policy on future persons is what would be after a transitional
period the actual situation if that policy is not implemented: a radically
different world in which none of those future persons would exist.
Unfortunately, any attempt to value the impacts of a policy on future
persons through the use of the willingness to pay metric when those impacts
are a necessary condition of their existence, no matter how sophisticated the
valuation methods and discounting procedures used, will result in truly
massive and essentially meaningless positive valuations for any policy
option whatsoever.
The cost-benefit methodology, premised as it is upon assessing the
willingness to pay of the persons affected by a policy, is therefore a suitable
approach only for valuing the impacts of a policy on those persons who are
already in existence, at least in utero, before the policy is implemented. If
one for some reason wants to consider only the impacts of a policy on
existing persons, and chooses to ignore the far larger endogeniety of
identity consequences of the policy for all future generations, the guidance
provided by such severely restricted cost-benefit analyses may be helpful,
although it is unclear exactly what justification could be offered for taking
such a circumscribed approach to assessing a particular policy. However,
climate regulation policies are obviously largely or even primarily focused
upon the long-term impacts of various courses of action upon future

147. See discussion supra Part III.A (talking about this idea as it applies to the Masur
and Posner paper); discussion supra Part III.B (discussing its application to the Revesz and
Shahabian paper); discussion supra Part III.C (detailing its application to the Ackerman and
Stanton paper).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 105–115 (illustrating the irrelevance of
analyzing discount rates when assuming exogeneity of identity).
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persons not yet in existence when the policies are implemented. A costbenefit analysis limited in scope to evaluating policy impacts upon existing
persons would therefore rather obviously be an unsuitable approach in this
context. My overall conclusion is that cost-benefit analysis, understood as
an attempt to assess policies solely with regard to their consequences for
actual persons, and committed to valuing those consequences in accordance
with the affected persons‘ willingness to pay to enjoy (or avoid) those
consequences, has no helpful role to play in formulating climate regulation
policy.

